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1The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States.  By Alexander
Keyssar.  (New York: Basic Books, 2000. xxiv, 467 pp.  Cloth, $30.00, ISBN 0-465-02968-X.)  
Why America Stopped Voting: The Decline of Participatory Democracy and the Emergence of
Modern American Politics.  By Mark Lawrence Kornbluh.  (New York and London: New York
Univ. Press, 2000.  xv, 243 pp.  Cloth, price?, ISBN 0-8147-4708-6.)
Keyssar’s largely intellectual history of suffrage throughout the nation’s history and
Kornbluh’s largely quantitative analysis of the transition from nearly universal male political
participation in the late 1800s to the much less active polity of the twentieth century underscore
a simple, but often neglected lesson: Because words and behavior are sometimes at variance,
scholars should study both.  The division of labor between these two books leads to
contradictory conclusions.  Despite mentions of low contemporary voter turnout and unequal
political power at the beginning and end of his book, Keyssar’s is mainly a hopeful story of the
sometimes reversed, but eventually successful dismantling of class, race, and gender barriers to
voting, in that unusual order of emphasis.  Kornbluh’s is explicitly a story of decline, from a late
nineteenth century polity in which nearly every man, at least in the North, not only voted, but
argued, marched, and often organized for his party, to a deferential, interest-group- and expert-
dominated political system in the twentieth.  In one, democracy flowers; in the other, it withers.
Limitations on their research strategies call some conclusions of both books into
question.  Thus, Keyssar’s deliberate inattention to voting behavior undermines his four-period
chronology. No doubt his first period, from the 1780s to 1850, saw loosened legal restrictions on
the suffrage.  But since most colonial historians estimate that 60-80% of adult white males could
vote, how much did the suffrage actually broaden during the first generations of the republic?  In
2light of the extremely high turnout rates from 1840 through 1896 and the lengthy, but ultimately
successful struggle for women’s suffrage, is Keyssar justified in calling 1850 the beginning of a
period of contraction, a “slow Thermidor” (80)?  Since women’s voting participation gradually
rose after the Nineteenth Amendment and since the basis for the full enfranchisement of
African-Americans was firmly laid in the 1940s and 50s, is it correct for him to characterize the
period from 1920 to 1960 as “the quiet years,” a period of “relatively little change” (xxii)?  And
since, according to most accounts, turnout decreased substantially from 1960 to the present, is
this really, as Keyssar terms it, an era of “breaking barriers”?
Not only Keyssar’s periodization, but also his emphases and conclusions derive from the
fact that his book is a description of conversations about suffrage, not of changes in voters’
actions or the causes or consequences of those changes.  More concerned with high-flown
rhetoric about principles than with analyses of why particular laws passed or failed, Keyssar
cannot systematically weigh the reasons for alterations in the suffrage; instead he repeatedly just
lists many incommensurable factors (e.g., 52).  This does not stop him from off-handedly (and
unjustifiably) dismissing explanations based on partisanship or self-interest as “superficial” and
embracing sound-bite-sized theories as “deeper” reasons for conflict over voting regulations
(298-99).  Keyssar seems insufficiently aware that policy debates are full of rationalizations --
none more than those that distribute political power.
By contrast, Kornbluh’s 165 pages of text, suitable for undergraduate assignment, contain
few quoted paeans to broad principles, but many descriptions of party practices, in addition to 31
tables and 17 maps and figures.  From 1880 to 1896, an average of 79 percent of the eligible
electorate voted in presidential elections; from 1900 to 1916, only 65 percent.  In off-year
3congressional elections from 1882 through 1894, 71 percent of northern eligibles voted, a figure
that dropped to 59 percent from 1898 to 1918.  (12, 89, 99) Before 1900, young men, farmers,
and recent male immigrants, many of whom could not read or speak much English, nearly all
participated in politics.  Elite reformers may have feared polyglot, multi-class democracy, as
Keyssar shows, but those fears manifestly did not prevent what Kornbluh calls “the full
politicization of late-nineteenth century America,” based on community-level partisan
organizations. (34-62) Partisanship is peripheral for Keyssar, central for Kornbluh.
After 1896, the percentage of voters who were perpetual political activists fell sharply,
substantial differentials in turnout by class, ethnicity, and age appeared for the first time since
the 1840s, and politics became a less important part of life in nearly every locality.  When
women were enfranchised, their participation was stunted, because most were socialized in the
use of the ballot in an era of lower turnout and party competition. (Kornbluh, 107-12)  Why the
transformation?  Keyssar and Kornbluh agree that in the South, laws that not only disfranchised
blacks and poor whites directly, but also indirectly discouraged voters by diminishing party
competition, account for the shift. (Keyssar, 111-15; Kornbluh, 98, 132-35) For the North,
Kornbluh adopts a version of the fait accompli thesis, which V.O. Key, Jr. developed in Southern
Politics, contending that laws that discouraged voters and undermined parties only permitted,
rather than determined the decline in turnout, the rises in split-ticket voting and candidate-
centered, rather than party-centered elections, and the shift to more active, administrative
government.  Instead, Kornbluh asserts, it was the decrease in party competition after 1896 that
produced these changes.  But scholars have rejected Key’s thesis for the South and have never
comprehensively tested it for the North, and Kornbluh’s application of it here begs the questions
4of why party competition declined and why the parties acquiesced in legal changes – the
Australian ballot, registration laws, civil service reform, primaries, non-partisan elections – that
decimated their power.  Analyses of election returns alone cannot answer these questions.
Keyssar’s and Kornbluh’s books also illustrate two important points about the field of
political history:  First, the secondary literature about voting is richer and much more interesting
than current denigrations of the history of formal public institutions imply.  Though Keyssar’s
theme is that historians have either ignored the history of the suffrage in America or that they
have treated it as a smooth and inevitable progressive expansion, his fifty small-print pages of
endnotes undercut both contentions.  If these contentions were correct, his book, the most
comprehensive and valuable overview of the suffrage in America ever published, could not have
been written, since it is necessarily based principally on secondary sources.  Second, many
unanswered, even unasked questions about suffrage and political participation remain.  Indeed,
Keyssar’s twenty appendices detailing state suffrage qualifications from 1790 through 1920,
many of which have never been closely examined by scholars, constitute a veritable catalog of
research projects.  And while Kornbluh points to social and legal transformations underlying the
decline in party competition after 1896, he does not fully document or account for them.  It is to
be hoped that these widely-researched, astute, well-written books will focus more of the
profession’s attention on institutional political history.  Much has been done, and more needs to
be.
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